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Early in the mock dedication to Lord Byron's comic epic Don
Juan, the raconteurish author/narrator slips in a footnote about a
rhyming contest between Ben Jonson and one John Sylvester:
[Sylvester] challenged [Jonson] to rhyme with-
'I, John Sylvester,
Lay with your sister.'
Jonson answered - 'I, Ben Jonson, lay with your wife.'
Sylvester answered - 'That is not rhyme.' 'No,' said Ben
Jonson; 'but it is true.'1
Interestingly, Byron tells this anecdote to make a point, not about sex,
but about narrative-though the overlap of terms is no accident.
Narrative, he suggests, begins in infidelity; narrative abrogates form,
social or esthetic, to accommodate experience. And, in so doing, it
simultaneously claims truth and produces pleasure.
Byron's anecdote is worth keeping in mind when confronting the
recent flurry of narratological activity among musical critics and
IByron, Don Juan, ed. Leslie A. Marchand (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958),461.
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analysts. As discontent with the conceptual and ideological impasses
of formalist approaches to music has grown-and it has grown
spectacularly in a very short time-narratological models have come to
seem increasingly attractive as means of endowing untexted Euro-
American art music with human content. The musical application of
these models, however, has been conspicuously un-Byronic. As usual
in musical studies, where the ideal of unity still retains the authority it
has largely lost in literary criticism, the idea has been to totalize. As
one recent essay forthrightly claims, "Studies in narratology have
identified syntagmatic or combinatory structures in narrative for which
parallels can be discerned in music. "2 Drawn prevailingly from
literary structuralism, the models of choice have understood narrative
preeminently as a source of structure rather than as a preeminent means
of resisting structure. Narratology has acted as a kind of methodologi-
cal halfway house in which musical meaning can be entertained without
leaving the safe haven of form. 3
This totalizing approach has met with skepticism from several
quarters. In an essay that probes the limits of structuralist narratology
as applied to music, Carolyn Abbate voices a "fear" that' 'the analogy
between music and narrative . . . may be used unthinkingly to elude
secret convictions that music has no meaning. "4 Pursuing the analogy
further, she reaches common ground with my book Music and Poetry:
The Nineteenth Century and After, concluding that' 'literary theories of
narrative suggest ways in which music cannot narrate, and how our
metaphor of narration collapses and lies empty-in strange folds and
2Roland Jordan and Emma Kafalenos, "The Double Trajectory: Ambiguity in
Brahms and Henry James," Nineteenth-Century Music 13 (1989): 132.
3A recent article by Joseph C. Kraus, "Tonal Plan and Narrative Plot in Tchai-
kovsky's Symphony No.5 in E Minor," Music Theory Spectrum 13/1 (1991): 21-47, can
be taken to epitomize this trend. Of undoubted technical interest, the essay hobbles itself
hermeneutically by its admitted anxiety over "emotive descriptions" and its presupposi-
tion that "narrative structure" is correlative to the articulation/perception of the work
as a "unified whole."
4Carolyn Abbate, "What the Sorcerer Said," Nineteenth-Century Music 12 (1989):
222.
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curves.,,5 In an overview of recent work in musical narratology, Jean-
Jacques Nattiez also argues compellingly (though one might demur at
the word 'superfluous') that "in itself, and as opposed to a great many
linguistic utterances, music is not a narrative and that any description
of its formal structures in terms of narrativity is nothing but superfluous
metaphor. "6 At best, Nattiez suggests, music "has the semiological
capacity of imitating the allure of a narrative, a narrative style or
mode" that historical hermeneutics may connect to "[the] reservoir of
philosophical, ideological and cultural traits characteristic of a
particular epoch" (pp. 253, 250).
If these arguments are right, as I believe they are, then any
theory of the relationship between music and narrative must start with
the cardinal fact that music can neither be nor perform a narrative. In
the strictest sense, there can be no musical narratology. At the same
time, the theory must assume that music is not limited to the function
assigned by Nattiez and Abbate of imitating narrative modes. If such
imitation is really a semiological capacity, then the protean, inveterately
ramifying character of signification all but guarantees that other
capacities are also in play. True to my title, I propose to identify three
of those other capacities, each of which corresponds to a different
element of the narrative situation generally conceived. The terms
chosen for these elements-narrative, narrativity, and
narratography-suggest my intention to short-circuit the notion of
narrative structure in order to clarify narrative as a mode of
performance.
Definitions first. Commonsensically enough, a narrative is an
acknowledged story, whether typical (an abstract sequence of events
repeatedly and variously concretized within a given historical frame) or
individual (one of the concretizations). Narrativity is the dynamic
5Abbate, "Sorcerer," 228; Lawrence Kramer, Music and Poetry: The Nineteenth
Century and After (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 7, 10-11.
6Jean-Jacques Nattiez, "Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?" Journal of the
Royal Musicological Association 115/1 (1990): 257.
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principle, the teleological impulse, that governs a large ensemble of all
narratives, up to and including the (imaginary) ensemble of all
narratives. Narrativity is the impetus that powers (what counts
culturally as) narrative itself. Finally, narratography is the practice of
writing through which narrative and narrativity are actualized, the
discursive performance through which stories actually get told.
Narratography can be said to govern two broad areas of representation:
the temporal disposition of events within and between narratives on the
one hand, and the sources of narrative information-from narrators,
characters, fictional documents, authorial agency-on the other.7
And the semiological capacities of music in relation to these
elements of narrative? In relation to a narrative, music is a
supplement, in the deconstructive sense of the term. In relation to
narrativity, music is a performative, in the sense of the term developed
by speech-act theory. And in relation to narratography, music is
something like an embodied critique of discursive authority. It will
prove convenient to take up these relationships last to first.
The most important characteristic of narratography, and the one
most often forgotten in musical applications, is that it is not only the
vehicle of narrative and narrativity but also-more so-their antagonist.
Narratography can be understood as a principled means of resistance
to continuity and closure. As the literary theorist J. Hillis Miller
suggests,
Each story and each repetition or variation of it leaves
some uncertainty or contains some loose end unraveling in
effect, according to an implacable law that is not so much
psychological or social as linguistic. This necessary
incompletion means that no story fulfills perfectly, once and
for all, its [cultural] function of ordering and confirming.
7For a fuller discussion of the representational areas involved in narratography and
their relation to music, see my Music as Cultural Practice: 1800-1900 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), 184-89.
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And so we need another story, and then another, and yet
another. 8
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We may choose to give more weight to social and psychological
motives than Miller does. In particular, we can, whether as writers or
readers, utilize the destabilizing effects of narratography to resist too
much "ordering and confirming"-to counter ideological suasions with
critical intelligence.
Musical narratography is no less subversive than its textual
counterpart, though it is less pervasive. As I have argued in detail
elsewhere, narratographic effects are hard to produce in music, and
they reward the work that produces them by destabilizing, in terms at
once formal, esthetic, and ideological, the musical order of things.
(Carolyn Abbate has made a parallel argument for scenes of narrative
in opera.)9 From one standpoint, this difficulty and instability are
reciprocals of each other. Since music as a medium depends, at least
locally, on enhanced forms of continuity-the musical processes of
ordering and confirming-music can produce narratographic effects
only in relationship to strategies of principled disruption: either as those
strategies themselves, or, reactively, as strategies of containment. This
is not to say, of course, that all musical disruptions and recuperations
have narratographic value. To speak credibly of narratography in
music we need to relate musical processes to specific, historically
pertinent writing practices. The same holds for narrative and
narrativity: music enters the narrative situation only in relation to
textuality, even when the music itself overtly lacks a text. The salient
claim, then, is that music becomes narratographically disruptive when
it seeks to jeopardize (or unwittingly jeopardizes) the dominant regimes
(or what it fictitiously represents as the dominant regimes) of musical
composition and reception. To use Nattiez's terms, music provokes us
8' 'Narrative, " in Critical Terms for Literary study, 00. Frank Lentriccia and Thomas
McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 72.
9JU'amer, Music as Cultural Practice, 186-89; Abbate, "Erik's Dream and
Tannhauser's Journey," in Reading Opera, 00. Arthur Groos and Roger Parker
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 129-67.
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to the narrative metaphor precisely when it seems to be undercutting its
own foundations.
For an exemplary glimpse of narratography at work, we can turn,
but with a certain demurral, to Anthony Newcomb's essay "Schumann
and Late Eighteenth-Century Narrative Strategies, " the critical text that
has done more than any other to stimulate the discussion of music and
narrative. 10 Writing of Robert Schumann's Carnaval, Newcomb
adverts to its famous pitch cells, which constitute anagrams on the
musical letters of Schumann's name. He suggests persuasively that the
recurrence of these cells throughout the otherwise motley collection of
miniatures reproduces a narrative strategy "beloved of Jean Paul
[Richter] and [Friedrich] SchlegeL" The strategy at hand depends on
what these authors called Witz, which Newcomb defines as the faculty
of discovering underlying connections in a surface of apparent
incoherence. Carnaval, Newcomb writes, "applies this technique to
the musical analogy to the Romantic fragment. A series of musical
fragments is held together by framing narrative devices and by the
buried interconnections of Witz" (p. 170). And it is precisely these
interconnections that make Schumann's "structural method" in
Carnaval "truly original" and "more than just titillating" (p. 169).11
Here as throughout his essay, Newcomb's critical practice is
totalizing; it produces insight by bidding up the value of organization
and coherence in the musical work. Problematical in any context, this
practice is especially problematical when it is applied recuperatively,
that is, used to install a latent order amid manifest disorder. Carnival,
Schumann's guiding idea, does not suggest buried interconnections; it
suggests flagrant anarchy. We should at least question, as Schumann
may have questioned and Schlegel certainly did, the assumption that
"witty" repetition constitutes a unifying force.
lONineteenth-Century Music 11 (1987): 164-74.
UFor a musical application of Witz that differs somewhat from Newcomb's, see John
Daverio, "Schumanns 'In Legendenton' and Friedrich Schlegel's Arabesque,"
Nineteenth-Century Music 11 (1987): 150-63.
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Schlegel's remarks on esthetics tend to be framed rhetorically
rather than conceptually; they do not presuppose a hierarchical schema
in which chaos is mediated by structure, but a figurative (usually
chiasmatic) schema in which chaos is structural, structure chaotic. "It
is equally deadly," he claims, "for the mind to have a system or to
have none. Therefore it will have to decide to combine both"
(Atheneum Fragment 53).12 True to the spirit of this aphorism,
Schlegel's Witz is a deliberately baffling hybrid. On the one hand, it
represents a gregarious sociability translated into conceptual terms; it
is "absolutely sociable spirit or aphoristic genius" (Lyceum Fragment
9). On the other hand, it is a violent centripetal force, "an explosion
of the compound spirit" (Lyceum Fragment 90); witty inspiration
occurs when "the friction of free sociability" working on the
, 'saturated" imagination suddenly produces a "dissolution of spiritual
substances that . . . must have been most intimately intermingled"
(Lyceum Fragment 90).
If Witz is really at work in Carnaval, then, we need to recognize
it, not as the principle that binds the unruly collection into a formal
whole, but as the force that arbitrarily breaks down a prior musical
whole-an unheard, imaginatively "saturated" inspiration-into
individuated musical aphorisms. Our critical approach should
subordinate the invariant pitch-content of Schumann's motivic cells to
their role in leading a motley parade of expressive variations.
Hermeneutic attention should go to the shape-changes that occur as one
thematic realization of the cells follows another, and to the figure-
ground ambiguity posed whenever a thematic realization merges into a
larger melodic phrase. Our critical practice should also be energized
by the anagrammatical aspect of the cells, a quality both arbitrary and
festive that may well extend to other, apparently more highminded
forms of structural continuity within the cycle. Schumann's version of
Witz, indeed, may turn out to have retransposed Schlegel's version
from intellectual to cultural and material sociability; it may function as
12Friedrich Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry andLiterary Aphorisms, trans. Ernst Behler
and Roman Struc (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1968). Subsequent
quotations draw on the same source.
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the sign of a transgressive social energy that both criticism and
performance can choose either to further or retard.
Narrativity is the next item on our agenda, and here we encounter
the use of narrative as a vehicle for both acculturation and resistance
to acculturation. By regulating the underlying dynamics of the stories
it encourages, mandates, or prohibits, a cultural regime perpetuates
itself in at least two ways. First, it prescribes an array of normative
character-types for its members. Second, it places the prescribed types,
each assigned its own mode of subjectivity and range of action, within
comprehensive networks of power and knowledge. 13 In relation to the
narrativity that impels them, sometimes conceived of as a latent master-
narrative, the stories themselves function along the lines of what J. L.
Austin called performative utterances; they do something (or fail to do
something) in being told. In this case, what the stories do-or fail to
do, sometimes wittingly-is the cultural work of modeling, of
symbolically enacting and enforcing, the process of prescription and
placement, or what Miller calls ordering and confirming. 14
Musical narrativity is still a little-explored topic. On two
occasions, however, I have been prompted to outline a model of
narrativity, based mainly on knowledge networks, that might be salient
to music. The first model is derived from the work of Frank Kermode
13As their language suggests, these formulations are indebted to Michel Foucault; see
especially his Discipline and Punish: The Birth o/the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New
York: Pantheon, 1977), and "The Subject and Power," Critical Inquiry 8 (1982): 777-85
(English in original), 785-95 (trans. Leslie Sawyer).
14J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Miller, "Narrative," 72. Frederic
Jameson's Marxist account ofhow narratives function ideologically, both constituting and
concealing themselves as imaginary resolutions to real contradictions in specific social
formations, can also be taken as a theory of what I am calling narrativity. Though meant
to accommodate resistance as well as compliance to dominant ideologies, Jameson's
theory is inflected by a pessimism that leads it to privilege compliance. See the essay
"Magical Narratives" in Jameson's The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially
Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 103-150.
Kramer, Musical Na"atology: A Theoretical Outline 149
and brought to bear on Brahm's Intermezzo in B minor, Op. 119, no.
1. It constructs a narrativity that seeks to impart human significance
to the uncertain interval between beginnings and endings. Narrativity
from this standpoint is a defensive effort to prevent the always
indeterminate middle interval from emptying itself out to become (or
reveal itself as) arbitrary or mechanical. The second model, poststruct-
uralist in inspiration and alert to the involvement of power networks,
is directed to Beethoven's "La Malinconia," the Finale to the String
Quartet in B-flat major, Op. 18, no. 6. It constructs a narrativity that
seeks to define and inhabit the gap between knowledge and belief,
certainty and surmise, identity and difference. From this standpoint,
narrativity may emerge either as the impulse to close the epistemic gap,
or as the countervailing impulse to prevent the gap from closing.15
With regard to power networks, Susan McClary has utilized
feminist models of narrativity to argue that music since the seventeenth
century has been regularly engaged in the cultural work of constructing
gender identities and the ideological work of enforcing them. Feminist
theorists, notably Teresa de Lauretis, have shown that Western
narrative typically models the efforts of a masculine protagonist to gain
cultural entitlement. To win that entitlement, the protagonist must
confront and master a feminine antagonist who sometimes appears as
a person and sometimes as a space or condition culturally encoded as
feminine. (power here maps onto knowledge when rationality becomes
the vehicle of mastery.) McClary shows how the dynamics of tonal
composition, especially in big public genres like nineteenth-century
symphony and opera, can be read against this master-narrative, whether
in compliance, contestation, or a mixture of both.16
15For the frrst model, see my "Dangerous Liaisons: The Literary Text in Musical
Criticism," Nineteenth-Century Music 13 (1989), 159-67. For the second model, see
Music as Cultural Practice, 182-203.
16Susan McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), esp. 3-79; Teresa de Lauretis, "Desire in
Narrative," Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1984), 103-57.
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The Finale of Beethoven's last string quartet (Op. 135 in F major)
offers a ready illustration of musical narrativity. The narrative element
of this music has always been recognized; Beethoven insisted on it.
The movement is famously entitled Der Schwer Gefasste Entschluss
(The Hard-Won Resolution) and prefaced by a matched pair of verbal
and musical mottos: Muss es sein? (Must it be?) inscribed under a short
chromatic motive and Es muss sein! (It must be!) inscribed under the
first motive's diatonicized inversion (Example 1). The Muss es sein?
motive rules the Grave introduction, which recurs, varied and
extended, to preface the recapitulation; the Es muss sein! motive gives
both the exposition and recapitulation their start.
Example 1.
DER SCHWER CEFASSTE ENTSCHLUSS.
Grn\·~.
:r
AII('~rn. I~. e Fa p 1& Ii e J ~) J f J I 09 ,/
Muss
.., Es win! Es ..cs nio! mIL'l.~ DlUSI lICID.
Critics have differed over how seriously to take the "hard-won
resolution, " the Grave sections striking some as fervid and others as
parodistic. 1? But in one respect, at least, the resolution is plainly a
sham, if not a skam. True to its type, the Grave introduction forms an
extended upbeat on the dominant, apparently anticipating a structural
downbeat on the tonic at the point where the Allegro starts and Es muss
sein! replaces Muss es sein? That is not what happens. The exchange
of melodic motives occurs on schedule, but the harmony lags behind;
the Allegro begins on the dominant and scurries to the subdominant as
fast as it can get there. The same thing happens later when the second
Grave introduces the recapitulation, although here the obligatory tonic
hastens to make a pro forma appearance in the middle of the fourth bar.
Mapped onto our first model of narrativity, these events show the
dominant becoming disoriented, directionless, emptying itself out as a
17For discussion see Joseph Kerman, The Beethoven Quartets (New York: Knopf,
1966), 362-67.
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passageway to the tonic. The result is to make Beethoven's hard-won
resolution seem a bit overwrought, too narcissistic to be a parody and
too capricious to be taken straight. It would seem to follow that any
narrative impetus in the music would be aimed at refreshing the sense
of resolution by somehow replenishing dominant-to-tonic movement as
the means of formal articulation on the largest scale.
And so it is. The replenishment evolves from a dialectical
process in which the Es muss sein! motive gradually assimilates itself
to the musical character of Muss es sein? The process begins in the
second Grave and concludes in yet another introductory (or transitional)
passage, this one set between the recapitulation and coda.
Near the end of the second Grave, the Es muss sein! motive
embraces the tempo of Muss es sein? and engages with it contrapuntally
and antiphonally (Example 2). The motivic interplay proves to be
transformative. The Muss es sein? motive appears in several new
forms, all of them lacking its characteristic closing interval of a
diminished fourth; the cello harps on one of these, while the viola
invents a series of extravagant variants-they are more like contor-
tions-that close on wide leaps. Punctuated by tremolos, this mixture
of insistence and dynamism exerts a strong dialectical attraction. The
Es muss sein! motive responds by taking a chromatic turn in the second
and third of its three statements, exchanging its characteristic closing
interval of a perfect fourth for the diminished fourth that Muss es sein?
Example 2. Beethoven, String Quartet in F Major, Op. 135. Finale:
end of second Grave section.
ii.... _ "1111. _ ,.. ""/.
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has left hanging. 18 Harmonically, however, the two motives remain
at odds, Es muss sein! proposing diatonic triads and Muss es sein?
countering antiphonally with diminished ones.
The dialectic continues after overlapping statements of the Es
muss sein! motive, in vigorous tonic-dominant harmony, to close the
recapitulation with a rock-solid cadence that feints at ending the whole
piece on its own. The rhYthmic energy of the motive, however, carries
the music onto strange new terrain. Catching at fermatas and eventual-
ly dropping in tempo to Poco Adagio (not to Grave, true, but in
context, close enough), the Es muss sein! motive goes on sounding,
reverberant, transforming itself quietly, lyrically, pensively. More
overlapping statements twice settle into chromatic harmonizations, then
come to rest through another diminished fourth on a lingering E-flat
minor triad (Example 3). In this way the dialectical circle closes.
Poignantly combining the chromatic shape it embraced in the second
Grave with the chromatic harmony it embraces here, the formerly
declarative Es muss sein! motive yields itself fully to the character of
the questioning Muss es sein?
Example 3. Beethoven, String Quartet in F Major, Gp. 135. Finale:
"introduction" to Coda.
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18It is worth noting that this intervallic exchange, in which the diminished fourth
replaces the perfect fourth, reverses an importantly situated earlier exchange. The
development begins with four unison statements of Es muss sein!, the first time with
diminished fourth, thereafter with perfect fourth.
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In so yielding, as Christopher Reynolds has suggested, Es muss
sein! becomes a literal acknowledgement that what any German
musician would call Es, the sonority of E-flat, must be. 19 Unstable
in the home key of F major, Es has acted as a sore note throughout the
quartet as a whole; the finale seeks a reckoning with it. The dialectic
between Muss es sein? and Es muss sein! takes Es, in the form of E-flat
minor, as both its origin (m. 4, bt. 3-m. 5, bt. 1, Example 2) and its
end. The hard-won resolution is, it turns out, the willing enhancement
of a dissonance. Structurally as well as expressively, the resolution
proves to be an act, not of self-assertion, but of concession, of pliancy,
of resignation. And it is precisely the generative interval in which that
resolution is won-won by losing-from which the coda springs forth
in high spirits to prolong the tonic reached by the emphatic cadence.2o
From the standpoint of musical structure, the passage preceding
the coda is an interpolation, a patch of detail applied to the foreground.
From the standpoint of narrativity, the same passage is a moment of the
highest importance. To invest so much value in a nonstructural detail
is, under a widely influential code, a culturally feminine gesture, and
the recognition of its gender-typing offers a new window onto its
narrative character.21
To open the window requires a shift in emphasis, along the
feminist lines suggested by Susan McClary, from knowledge to power
in our construction of narrativity. Given the polar opposition of the
Muss es sein? and Es muss sein! motives, the yearning chromaticism
of the one and vigorous diatonicism of the other readily assimilate
themselves to the normative cultural polarity of feminine and mascu-
19Christopher Reynolds, "The Representational Impluse in Late Beethoven, II: String
Quartet in F major, Op. 135," paper presented at a symposium on music and narrative,
Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley, May 1988. On the
"sore note" (below), see both Reynolds and Kerman, Beethoven Quartets, 356, 359,
366.
200n generative intervals, see my Music and Poetry, 87-90, 229-31.
210n the femininity of detail, see Naomi Schor, Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the
Feminine (New York: Methuen, 1987).
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line. If we recognize this further gender-typing, we can hear the
course of Beethoven's hard-won resolution as a critique of the
hegemonic master-narrative of masculine cultural entitlement. From
this standpoint, the lyricizing chromatic evolution ofEs muss sein! rests
on a narrative impetus to identify with, not against, the feminine. The
resolution, hard-won and soft-voiced, consists in the choice to forgo
mastery in favor of desire (the chromatic expressiveness) and pleasure
(the piquant coda). From this standpoint, too, the lack of harmonic
opposition between the Muss es sein? and Es muss sein! motives at
structural junctures becomes an opportunity rather than a problem. The
lack, itself coded as feminine, becomes a pleasurable surplus. It dallies
with the stern claims of the master-narrative and fosters the counter-
narrative that will later be realized in the mysterious, off-center
moments of affinity between the declarative and questioning motives.
The last item on our agenda, narrative proper, is at once the
simplest and, in terms of music, the most problematical. To restate the
cardinal point: the very premise of musical narratology is the recogni-
tion that music cannot tell stories. This defect-or virtue-is not
affected by the ability of music to deploy narratographic strategies or
to perform narrativistic rituals; both the strategies and the rituals are
migratory, easily displaced from the venues of storytelling. Nonethe-
less, music since the Renaissance has been used incessantly to
accompany stories. The usage forms a common thread among
otherwise dissimilar musical genres: ballads and other narrative songs,
lyrical songs with narrative elements, melodramas, operatic narratives,
program music, and what might be called virtual program music, music
that, like Beethoven's symphonies in the nineteenth century, compels
audiences to find originary stories where the composer has left them
unspecified. As an accompaniment to narrative, music assumedly does
what all accompaniments do: it adds something extra. But there must
be more involved than that, someone will argue. Surely the most
memorable thing about the genres just listed is their music, not their
narratives. And the truth in this rejoinder leads straight to the semiotic
logic that joins music to narrative, namely what Jacques Derrida calls
the logic of the supplement.
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As Derrida notes in his book Of Grammatology, the term
,'supplement" is intriguingly ambiguous. On the one hand a supple-
ment is an excess, a pertinent but inessential item added to something
complete in itself. On the other hand a supplement is a remedy, an
item called on to make good a fault or lack. For Derrida, this
ambiguity poses a choice far less than it defines a rhythm, which he
calls a logic. By taking on a supplement, a presumed whole puts its
wholeness into question. The act of addition exposes an unacknowl-
edged lack which the supplement is needed to counter. And in
countering that lack the supplement exceeds its mandate and comes to
replace the whole it was meant (not even) to repair. In his essay "The
Pharmacy of Plato," Derrida shows how the account of speech and
writing in Plato's dialogues is governed by the logic of the supplement.
For Plato, writing is a poison (pharmakon), a deceptive and artifical
mechanism that blights the natural immediacy of speech. But writing
is also a medicine (again pharmakon) that cures the ills of speech,
especially the inability of speech to create an archive, a storehouse of
memory. Philosophy itself, Plato's highest good, depends on the
dangerous drug, the supplement, of writing. 22
Music and narrative obey the same logic of bouleversement:
music is the supplement of narrative. Emotionally suggestive and
technically arcane, music adds itself to the closed circle-apparently all
self-sufficiency and self-evidence-of an acknowledged story. The
result would be sheer bemusement if we were not so used to it. The
narrative circle breaks; the music becomes the primary term and the
story its mere accompaniment. Why bother to follow all that stuff
Wotan is saying to Erda when we can just listen to the doom-laden
procession of the leitmotives?
Before tracing the supplemental relationship of music to narrative
in a specific piece-Schubert's song "Geistes Gruss"-I would like to
dwell for a moment on its general cultural importance, as manifested
in one of the most pervasive of modern musical institutions: the use of
22Jacques Derrida, O/Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 141-56; "Plato's Pharmacy," Dissemination,
trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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music to accompany narrative film or video. Without engaging in a
full-fledged discussion, it can credibly be suggested that the music on
a sound track, which we so often think: of as an annoyance, a musical
elbow in the ribs, is a supplement needed to remedy a medium-specific
lack.23
The screen for both film and television is a depthless, textureless
plane. Without the addition of sound, its sheer flatness can quickly
alienate the spectator, deflating and distancing the projected images.
Recorded speech-or, in silent movies, the use of often superfluous
intertitles as speech-simulacra-supplements the images and inhibits
alienation. Where speech must be minimized, in lyrical montage or
narrative situations of action, suspense, or passion, music is conscripted
as a further supplement. Sound-track music, even at its most banal,
connects us to the spectacle on screen by invoking a dimension of
depth, of interiority, borrowed from the responses of our own bodies
as we listen to the insistent production of rhythms, tone colors, and
changes in dynamics. (Melody, I suspect, has little importance here,
except insofar as certain styles of melody may invoke cultural codes.)
True, we do not, as we watch, usually experience the kind of full
displacement of narrative by music so common at the opera; once our
distance from the screen collapses, the rhetoric of the camera is
altogether compelling. But the power of the supplement is more than
evident in the rhetorical command exercised even by music that, heard
out of context, would strike us as shabby or indifferent.
Example 4. Schubert, "Geistes Gruss."
23My comments on this topic may be taken to complement Claudia Gorbman's
semiotic-psychoanalytic discussion in her Unheard Melodies: Narrative Film Music
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); see esp. 1-69.
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To return to specifics: Schubert's early song "Geistes Gruss," a
Goethe setting, is brief, strikingly varied in texture given its brevity,
and not monotonal (Example 4). Goethe's text is a lyric, not a
narrative, but the lyric speaker does quote a narrative, part of the
spirit's greeting of the title:
Hoch auf den alten Turme
Steht das HeIden edler Geist,
Der, wie das Schiff voriibergeht,
Es wohl zu fahren heisst.
"Sieh, diese Senne war so stark,
Herz so fest und wild,
Die knochen voll von Rittermark,
Der Becher angefiillt;
Mein halbes Leben stiirmt'ich fort,
Verdehnt' die Halft' in Ruh' ,
Und du, du Menschen-Schifflein dort,
Fahr' immer, immer zu."
158 Indiana Theory Review Vol. 12
[High on the ancient tower stands the hero's noble
spirit, who, as the ship passes by, bids it a good
voyage. "Behold, these sinews were so strong, heart so firm
and wild, my bones full of knight's-marrow, my
goblet brimming full; half of my life I stormed on,
drew out half in rest, and you, you little ship of
humanity there, voyage always, always on.' ']
The poem can be said to pivot on the contrast between the heroic spirit,
who narrates, and the lyric speaker and voyaging listeners, who only
report and receive narration. The spirit is enabled as a narrator less by
his life than by his death. Coinciding with narrative closure, death
permits him to represent his life as a finished pattern, a coherent whole
composed of two complementary halves. His rhetoric, a quasi-
chiasmus, underlines the point, joining the movement of action and
repose within the enclosing halves of a life completed: halbes
Leben-stiirmt'-verdehnt'-die Hiilft' . With the spirit as his
mouthpiece, Goethe anticipates the concept of narrative voiced by the
literary theorist Walter Benjamin in a classic essay, "The Storyteller":
Death is the sanction of everything that the storyteller can
tell. He has borrowed his authority from death.... [A
man] who died at thirty-five will appear to remembrance at
every point in his life as a man who dies at the age of
thirty-five.... The nature of the character in the novel
cannot be presented any better than is done in this
statement, which says that the "meaning" of his life is
revealed only in his death.24
Reading from Benjamin's vantage-point, we can identify Goethe's spirit
with the spirit of Narrative itself. In greeting the living, he urges them
to seek the goal of the past tense, the tale told, a goal that will always
be found in the distance while they live on.
24From Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, 00. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New
York: Schocken, 1969), 94, 100-101. "The Storyteller" was written in 1936.
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The poem, however, uses its handling of quotation to counteract
this recession to the distance. The spirit's narrative, not merely the gist
of the story but its very language, conforms lyrically to the stanzaic
pattern set by the speaker. The spirit, indeed, exceeds the speaker in
lyrical involution, rhyming his stanzas abab as against the speaker's
looser abcb. The spirit narrates in and through an intensification of the
speaker's lyric voice; he has no voice of his own. Given that the
spirit's oracular authority depends on the restriction of narrative
coherence to the dead, the speaker utilizes a rhetorical device-a form
of prosopopoiea, lending the dead a voice-to appropriate that
coherence and claim that authority on behalf of the living.
Schubert redresses the balance on behalf of the dead. His specific
supplement to the Text, the musical representation of the speaker's and
spirit's different voices, obscures and even revokes the speaker's
rhetorical efforts. Schubert endows the speaker and spirit with different
tonalities, E major and G major respectively, backed by different
accompanimental textures, continuous tremolos versus intermittent
dotted rhythms. The act of quotation occurs when the speaker's voice,
with neither tonal nor textural transition, gives way to the spirit's. This
rather self-abnegating form of quotation turns into a kind of
dispossession, a literal re-voking of one voice by another, when the
music ends in the spirit's G major instead of the speaker's E. Where
the poem unites the two voices on behalf of the speaker, the song
divides them on behalf of the spirit. The spirit irrevocably claims-or
reclaims-the distance from the living that is proper to him, and with
it his imposing oracular mantle. His music has virtually nothing in
common with the speaker's excejlt a harmonic preference for the sixth
scale degree, and even this serves as a sign of the spirit's recession into
the distance. When vi of G, E minor, emerges near the close of the
song (m. 26), it represents the speaker's E major in attenuated form,
the tonic-that-might-have-been. Its presence, coming as the spirit hails
the voyagers, informs us that the speaker will not be closing his
quotation. He cannot do so; he has lost his voice.
More unreservedly than Goethe, Schubert prefigures Benjamin's
view of narrative; his setting of "Geistes Gruss" reaffirms that
narrative addresses the living but empowers only the dead. This idea
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is developed further through the handling of both cadences and melodic
deep structure. The cadential technique could not be simpler. After
establishing E major as the apparent tonic, the speaker's music travels
through a circle-of-fifths progression to a cadence on the dominant and
there breaks off (mm. 9-13). The speaker departs voicing an
expectation that will never be satisfied. Tonal closure comes only in
another key, another voice, when the spirit completes his narrative
address with a V-I cadence in G major (mm. 30-31). A piano postlude
concludes the song with two echoes of this cadence over a tonic pedal,
as if the spirit's narrative and its implications were reverberating
on-"immer, immer zu"-in memory.
Example 5. Schubert,' 'Geistes Gruss": analysis.
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These cadential processes work in tandem with the deep structures
shown in Example 5, an abbreviated Schenkerian graph. The speaker's
music would seem to begin a fundamental line on 5, but the line thus
begun is frozen, unable to descend; at this level the speaker's melodic
A
action consists only of the decoration of the initial 5 by its upper
neighbor. Ironically, the foreground vocal line begins with a phrase
• A A •
that consIsts of a complete descent from 5 to 1, as If to show what
shape the fundamental line would take if only there were one (mm. 4-5,
Examples 4, 5). And indeed, the fundamental line that the song
eventually provides does take that very shape. But the line, of course,
belongs to the spirit, not to the speaker. The living lyric voice is
immobile, powerless; the dead narrative voice begins anew, on a
A A
different 5, and descends to its alien 1 with perfect aplomb.
The midpoint of this descent is especially worth noting. It occurs
a little more than halfway through the spirit's section and coincides
with the completion of a quasi-symmetrical foreground image of
narrative complementarity. The image consists of the phrase "mein
halbes Leben stiirmt' ich fort" sung to a dominant scale ascending to
C5, followed by the phrase "verdehnt' die H~ilft' in Ruh" sung mainly
to a dominant arpeggio descending from C5 (mm. 21-25). The second
phrase ends with a cadence as the spirit sings "Ruh" on j of the
fundamental line over a tonic octave in the bass (m. 25). With these
materials Schubert issues a reciprocal pair of claims on the spirit's
behalf. By using a microcosm of narrative totality to produce a root-
position cadence, he makes musical closure a function of narrative
authority and projects that authority forward to the cadence that ends
the song. And by meshing the narrative microcosm with a major
structural node, he invests narrative authority with a dynamic impetus
that concretizes itself in the desire for musical closure.
With "Geistes Gruss" we come to the end of this outline of
musical narratology. Of the possible conclusions to be drawn from it,
the one I would single out as primary is that narrative elements in
music represent, not forces of structure, but forces of meaning. That
meaning may be read in terms principally social and cultural, as in the
case of Beethoven's last quartet, or in terms principally epistemic and
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self-reflective, as in "Geistes Gruss," or in terms that explicitly
address the intersection of social, cultural, epistemic, and self-reflective
formations, as in the case of Schumann's Carnaval. Anyone looking
to narratology as a means of illuminating musical structure and musical
unity had better look somewhere else. The condition of narrative, as
Byron was trying to tell us, is fractious and disorderly. Structure and
unity are its playthings, and its claims to truth are strongest when
mixed up most bemusingly with sex and power.
